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Abstract
We report an experimental test of alternative rules in innovation contests
when success may not be feasible and contestants may learn from each other.
Following Halac et al. (forthcoming), the contest designer can vary the prize
allocation rule from Winner-Take-All in which the first successful innovator
receives the entire prize to Shared in which all successful innovators during
the contest duration share in the prize. The designer can also vary the infor-
mation disclosure policy from Public in which at each period, all information
about contestants’ past successes and failures is publicly available, to Private,
in which contestants only know their own histories. In our setting, the optimal
contest design in terms of maximizing the probability that at least one innova-
tor is successful depends on the probability of successful innovation, given that
innovation is feasible. Under some parameters the designer will prefer a WTA-
Public contest; while, under others he will prefer Shared-Private. Our experi-
ments provide evidence that Private disclosure contests behaviorally dominate
Public disclosure, regardless of the prize allocation rule, and moreover that
Shared-Private contests dominate WTA-Private contests.
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1 Introduction
The use of contests to spur innovation is not new. In 1714 the British govern-
ment instituted prizes for the creation of methods to accurately measure longitude
(Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). Recently, contests have seen increasing popularity as a
mechanism for encouraging innovation in diverse arenas. In fact, the 2011 America
COMPETES Reauthorization Act allows US government agencies to conduct contests
to encourage innovation. Perhaps the best known example of an innovation contest
is the Ansari XPrize, which offered $10 million to the first private entity to build
a craft with a demonstrated capability to carry three people 100 kilometers above
the Earth twice in a two week span. The prize was claimed by Mojave Aerospace
Ventures in 2004 and helped invigorate interest in private space exploration to the
point that Virgin Galactic now accepts reservations for future space flights. Other
examples that might be of interest to readers of this paper are the Millennium Prizes
which offer $1 million to the first person to solve any of several classic math problems.
While there have been many innovation contests, there has been little heterogeneity
in their structure, with the first successful innovator claiming the full prize.
An important consideration for re-designing innovation contests is a recognition
that not all innovations are possible and thus the contest may not have a winner
(Loury, 1979; Chowdhury, 2009). Taylor (1995) distinguishes between research tour-
naments and innovation contests. The former has a fixed deadline and success is
relative; while, the latter has a fixed threshold for success but no deadline. Innova-
tion contests are closely connected to patent races (e.g. Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980,
Grossman and Shapiro 1987, Harris and Vickers 1987, Erkal and Minehart, and ex-
perimental work by Sbriglia and Hey 1994, Zizzo 2002, Deck and Erkal 2013). One
issue that has been examined in detail in the race literature is the degree to which
1
one party’s intermediate success can be observed and copied by rivals (e.g. Scotchmer
and Green, 1990; d’Aspremont et al., 2000; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Fershtman and
Markovich, 2010). If early progress can easily be copied, then players may have an
incentive to delay their own costly efforts. However, the ability of others to incorpo-
rate a rival’s discovery could reduce the time until an ultimate success is reached or
increase the probability that someone is ultimately successful.
Recently, Halac et al. (forthcoming) developed a model specifically focused on in-
novation contests, building on previous work on contests with learning by Choi (1991),
Malueg and Tsutsui (1997), Mason and Va¨lima¨ki (2015), and Moscarini and Squintani
(2010). Halac et al. (forthcoming) consider the problem faced by the contest designer
who wants to maximize the chance that an innovation is made.1 The innovator is
assumed to receive no private benefit from the innovation beyond the prize money,
and the contest designer does not value a second or alternative solution.2 In Halac
et al. (forthcoming) there is a single step stochastic innovation process which a player
can attempt to complete in each time period. The tools at the contest designer’s dis-
posal are how the prize is distributed among those who succeed in innovation (with
a continuum of policies including winner-take-all and equal sharing among successful
innovators) and to what degree the results from previous innovation attempts become
public or remain private (ranging from all results made public to all kept private).3
The intuition for the tradeoffs created by these mechanisms for a contest designer
is as follows. A winner-take-all policy provides a strong incentive to attempt innova-
tion; however, prize sharing alleviates the concern that a successful innovator’s efforts
1Notice that this objective is different from that of a planner who seeks to maximize welfare.
2Thus, the innovation itself is not patentable so the innovator cannot retain intellectual property
rights. An alternative interpretation is that contest entry requires innovators to turn over all resulting
intellectual property to the contest designer.
3Thus, they (and we) implicitly assume that the designer can monitor the performance of all
contestants.
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will not be rewarded. Non-disclosure of rivals’ past failures reduces discouragement;
while, public disclosure provides information about the remaining prize money. The
interaction of these mechanisms is complex. However, in a two-player, two-period
version of the model due to Halac et al. (forthcoming), the result is that the opti-
mal innovation contest is either one with private information and prize-sharing or
with public information and winner-take-all rules, depending on the likelihood that
innovation is possible.4
This paper employs a within-subject experimental design to test the predictions of
Halac et al. (forthcoming). We focus on this paper for a number of reasons. First, this
prominent model is based on the “workhorse exponential-bandit framework [of] Keller
et al. (2005)” which has been widely used to study innovation in theory (Halac et al.,
forthcoming, p. 1). Second, the levers of policy available to the contest designer
in the model are straightforward and potentially available to contest designers in
practice. Third, the theory makes counterintuitive predictions that yield surprising
policy prescriptions. As Smith (1994) points out, one valuable use of laboratory
experiments is in institutional testbedding, since the lab allows researchers to try out
a novel institution in a low stakes setting prior to field implementation.
As a preview of the experimental findings, a prize sharing rule without the ability
to monitor a rival’s success in period one does the most to encourage innovation.
Further, when initial outcomes are private, a winner-take-all prize can discourage
investment after an initial failure. That observed behavior doesn’t completely match
the theoretical predictions highlights the importance of laboratory test-bedding. Our
experiments suggest that the domain over which a private disclosure, equal-sharing
contest is preferred by the designer is even larger than anticipated.
4In the more general setting in continuous time with N potential innovators, they find that prize-
sharing with public disclosure only after some number of successes have occurred is often the optimal
policy; though in many cases, the private disclosure, equal-sharing policy is optimal.
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2 Theoretical Considerations
The theory motivating the experiments is drawn directly from Halac et al. (forthcom-
ing) and hence this section closely follows Section 2 of that paper. Sufficient details
are provided for the reader to understand the setting and the predicted behavior, but
the reader seeking greater detail or proofs should consult Halac et al. (forthcoming).
Consider a contest designer whose objective is to encourage R&D directed towards
a certain goal, while also avoiding costly duplication. Specifically, the designer is
assumed to have lexicographic preferences where the primary focus is on the chance
that an innovation is made and the second dimension is the investment cost.5 This
goal may (the good state) or may not (the bad state) be obtainable. Formally, let the
probability of the good state in which the goal is achievable be pgood ∈ (0, 1). Further,
suppose there are two risk-neutral, non-discounting prospective innovators (players),
each of whom has an identical prior p0 = pgood regarding the probability that the goal
is achievable. Also, let there be 2 periods in which each player can privately choose
whether or not to attempt innovation at a cost c > 0. Conditional on being in the
good state, R&D success is stochastic. That is, if a player invests, and the state of
the world is good, he will discover the innovation with probability λ ∈ (0, 1). All
innovators’ draws are iid given the state of the world. If the player does not invest
or the state of the world is bad, he will discover the innovation with probability 0.
The designer has a prize budget v to offer incentives for the players to innovate, and
he wants at least one success (a second success has no marginal benefit). Following
Halac et al. (forthcoming), the designer can vary two dimensions of the innovation
contest: the prize allocation rule, which determines how the prize is allocated between
successful innovators, and the information disclosure policy, which determines what
5There is no benefit to the designer of having multiple successful innovations, and it is normatively
appealing that the designer also seeks to discourage costly duplication effort.
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information the designer discloses about the period 1 choices and outcomes of other
players prior to period 2.
Prize allocation rule. There are two prize allocation rules: Winner-Take-All
(WTA), in which the first successful innovator collects the entire prize (unless both
succeed in the same period, in which case the prize is shared); and Shared, in which
any innovator who succeeds in any period earns an equal share of the prize.
Information disclosure policy. There are two information disclosure policies:
Public, in which the designer makes public all information about decisions and out-
comes in period 1; and Private, in which the designer shares no information about
what transpired in period 1.
The result is four types of innovation contests, each of which creates very different
incentives for innovation. To see why, each contest type is discussed in turn, but first
one should note that a player would never choose to innovate in period 2 after his
own success in period 1.
WTA-Public. The WTA-Public format combines a winner-take all allocation
rule with full disclosure of period 1 outcomes prior to period 2. First consider the
problem faced by a player deciding whether to enter in period 1 of a WTA-Public.
A player’s expected prize conditional on being successful equals v˜ = λv/2 + (1− λ)v
assuming the other player is attempting innovation. As long as p0λv˜ > c, a player
prefers to enter the contest in period 1. If a player is unsuccessful in period 1, the
decision to try again in period 2 is contingent upon what happened to the other player
in period 1. If the other player was already successful there is no reason to engage
in R&D in period 2 since the player cannot claim any portion of the prize. If the
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other player was also not successful in period 1 then the (Bayesian) belief about the
probability that the state of the world is good is p1 =
p0(1−λ)2
p0(1−λ)2+1−p0 and the player
will enter the contest again in period 2 if and only if:
p1λv˜ ≥ c (1)
Shared-Public. In a Shared-Public contest, information is publicly disclosed
after period 1 as in WTA-Public, but the prize allocation rule divides the prize equally
among any players who succeed, regardless of whether they succeed in period 1 or
2. Since period 1 successes are publicly disclosed, any player whose counterpart was
successful in period 1 will know with certainty that the state of the world is good
and will know that the reward for success in period 2 is v/2, since the prize is shared
by all who succeed. If λv/2 ≥ c, the lagging player will attempt to duplicate his
counterpart’s success in period 2. Thus at period 1, the incentive to enter is lower
than in in WTA-Public as the expected prize is reduced. 6 On the other hand, if
λv/2 < c then the lagging player will not enter in period 2, so that this contest is
equivalent to WTA-Public. Moreover, if neither player succeeds in period 1, then the
decision to enter in period 2 is still governed by the inequality in (1). Thus, from the
designer’s point of view, the WTA-Public contest weakly dominates the Shared-Public
contest.
WTA-Private. A WTA-Private contest combines the winner-take-all allocation
rule with a disclosure policy that withholds information about the decisions and
6This may also encourage free-riding as players may benefit from waiting to learn more about
the state of the world. Our parameter choices are such that this situation does not arise.
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outcomes in period 1 until the end of period 2. The period 1 decision is essentially
the same as the period 1 decision for a WTA-Public contest. Where the two differ is
in the second period. In the WTA-Private contest, period 2 R&D may be futile as
the other person may have already been successful and thus claimed the entire prize.
The period 2 entry decision of player i thus depends on the following inequality:
Pr(j failed|i failed)p1λv˜ ≥ c (2)
Since Pr(j failed|i failed)p1 < p1, there are situations in which players will want to
enter in period 2 under WTA-Public rules, but not under WTA-Private rules. Thus,
from the designer’s perspective WTA-Public dominates WTA-Private.
Shared-Private. A Shared-Private contest combines the prize sharing alloca-
tion rule with the non-disclosure rule. Since information about success (and failure)
remains private, the intentional duplication problem that arises under Shared-Public
is alleviated here, although duplication could still occur. Since a player can learn
nothing about the counterpart after period 1, there is no loss in assuming that a
player will enter in period 1 if they enter the contest at all. For parameters such
that both players enter the contest in period 1, a player who is unsuccessful in period
1 must take into account two alternative possibilities when deciding whether to try
again in period 2. First, his counterpart may have succeeded already, in which case
the player’s posterior belief that he is in the good state of the world is 1, and he will
earn v/2 if he enters and succeeds in period 2. Second, his counterpart may have also
failed in period 1, in which case his posterior is p1, and he will earn v˜ if he enters and
succeeds in period 2. The decision to enter in period 2 thus depends on the following
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inequality:
Pr(j succeeded|i failed)λv
2
+ Pr(j failed|i failed)p1λv˜ ≥ c (3)
Crucially, there are combinations of parameters under which (3) is less strin-
gent than (1), so that the designer may sometimes prefer a Shared-Private contest
to WTA-Public, despite WTA-Public (weakly) dominating both WTA-Private and
Shared-Public in the sense of maximizing the probability of at least one success.
Intuitively, this is because concealing information in Shared-Private eliminates the
discouragement spillover that arises from observing two unsuccessful attempts at in-
novation in period 1 that can arise in WTA-Public and because sharing the prize
allows the player to condition his value of entry in period 2 partly on the possi-
bility that his counterpart was successful (and not only on the possibility that he
failed). Various combinations of parameters can generate the same results, but the
conditions are non-monotonic, making simple comparisons difficult. Our experimen-
tal design uses parameter values that alter this comparative static to provide a test
of the model. The specific parameters and associated theoretical predictions are in
the next section.
3 Experimental Design
The experiments are designed to evaluate the relative success of each innovation con-
test structure for encouraging innovation. In particular, the goal is to determine
whether WTA-Public dominates both WTA-Private and Shared-Public as predicted
but that the relative success of WTA-Public and Shared-Private depends on the likeli-
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hood of innovation success. Specifically, we hold constant the values of v, c, and pgood
at $40, $6, and 0.8, respectively and vary the value of λ within each contest format.
While in principle, we could have varied other parameters to get similar comparative
static predictions, we chose to vary λ because we thought that this was the simplest
for subjects to understand and still offer policy guidance to contest designers facing
challenges of varying difficulty.7
The experiments were conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at
the University of Alaska - Anchorage. Subjects were recruited from the lab’s standing
pool of volunteers, the vast majority of who are undergraduates at the school. Sub-
jects were given $5 for arriving on time for the one hour study. Subjects also received
salient earnings which averaged $26.11. A total of 56 subjects completed the study.
Six additional subjects, one per session, served as monitors, a role that is explained
below.
The decision environment is complex and several iterations of the experimental
procedures were tested in pilot sessions. The final design delivered instructions via an
automated PowerPoint presentation, physical props, and a written response form in
order to facilitate subject understanding.8 To further facilitate understanding of the
within-subject design, the various treatments, which correspond to the different inno-
vation contest formats, were introduced in a fixed sequence, although subjects could
revisit past decisions at any point in an effort to mitigate possible order effects. Here
the experimental procedures are described in the corresponding manner to facilitate
reader understanding.
7The other obvious candidate to vary is pgood, which could be used to generate similar predictions.
Ultimately, this design decision is arbitrary ex ante, although it could have behavioral implications
ex post.
8The PowerPoint is available for download here:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/3gqqvpkarwnn6ui/FinalInstructions.pptx?dl=0.
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3.1 Start of a Session
Subjects entered the lab and were seated at private cubicles. An automated presenta-
tion was shown on a screen at the front of the lab. As explained in the presentation,
one subject was randomly selected to be the monitor based on the role of a die.
The role of the monitor was to ensure that all of the procedures described in the
presentation were implemented exactly.
3.2 Individual Choices
The presentation first described how an Individual choice task would work. These
tasks involve a single period in which a single player could choose to attempt to make
an innovation. To the subjects, opportunity to engage in R&D was presented as the
opportunity to draw a poker chip from a bag containing 20 chips. Drawing a green
chip corresponded to innovation success (worth $40) and drawing a black chip cor-
responded to innovation failure (worth $0). The cost of innovation was implemented
as an opportunity cost as subject would receive $6 for not drawing a chip. Since the
pgood = 0.8, subjects were informed that a 10 sided die would be rolled and if the
die landed on a 1 or a 2 then a bag with 20 black chips would be used and if the
die landed on a 3 - 10 a bag containing a mix of green and black chips would be
used. The die, chips, and bags were shown to the subjects. The presentation ex-
plained that the response form would contain 5 individual choice tasks that differed
by the number of green chips that might be in the bag (i.e. the value of λ). The
presentation also explained that subjects would complete a total of 25 tasks, the five
Individual tasks plus 20 additional tasks that would be explained as the experiment
progressed, and that exactly one of these 25 tasks would be randomly selected to
determine the subject’s payment. No outcomes were realized until all 25 tasks were
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completed. After going through some example scenarios, the subjects completed a
set of comprehension questions, correct answers to which were worth $0.50 apiece.
Once every subject’s responses to the comprehension questions were checked by the
researcher, the response forms for Individual choices were distributed and subjects
indicated their choices.9
The specific values of λ were 0.00, 0.15, 0.25, 0.40, and 0.70, which correspond
to 0, 3, 5, 8, and 14 green chips accordingly. Because of the individual nature of
these tasks, in addition to familiarizing subjects with the experiment, responses can
be used to classify the risk attitude of a subject. The specific values of λ were selected
as they closely correspond to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter
thresholds from Holt and Laury (2002).
3.3 Shared - Private Choices
After everyone had completed the Individual tasks, Shared-Private contests were
introduced. Referred to only as Private choices, the task introduced the concept
of a two period problem in which the outcomes depended on the choices and success
of two players. The presentation went through several examples after which the
subjects answered more paid comprehension questions. Finally, the response forms
were distributed and the subjects could make their decisions. At this point in the
experiment, subjects were required to attempt innovation in period 1. This design
feature was intended to reduce confusion by focusing subjects’ attention on second
period decisions.10 The response form only asked the subject if she wanted to make
a second draw from the bag conditioned on having drawn a black chip initially. The
9Copies of the comprehension questions, response forms, and survey are available in an online
appendix: https://www.dropbox.com/s/zfg30pyxrudepj1/ResponseForm.pdf?dl=0.
10Choices were elicited via the strategy method, as subjects were subsequently allowed make
decisions for period 1; see below.
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values of λ were 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.00. We discuss the predicted behavior
for different values of λ below after introducing the other contest formats.
3.4 Subsequent Choices
In turn the WTA-Private, referred to as Private Choice - First Green, the WTA-
Public, referred to as Public Choice - First Green, and the Shared-Public, referred to
as Public Choice - Any Green were introduced. In each case the directions explained
the difference between the current rules and the rules that were in place previously.
The presentation went through relevant examples to highlight the changes and each
section involved paid comprehension questions. The values of λ were the same in each
of these contest formats as in Shared-Private.
3.5 End of the Experiment
After completing all 5 response forms, subjects were then given the option to opt
out of any of the two period innovation contests they wished by placing an X over
the specific scenario on the appropriate response form. This implementation of the
strategy method was designed to reduce confusion by facilitating backward induction.
This also means that subjects could not opt to not attempt innovation in period 1,
but then attempt innovation in period 2.11 That is, the decision to opt out meant
that the subject would not draw a chip at either opportunity and as a result would
earn $12 ($6 for each opportunity to draw a chip that was not taken). As explained
to the subjects, random pairs were formed among those subjects that did not opt out,
and thus one’s period 2 decisions were always contingent on both players attempting
innovation in period 1.
11Given the parameters, this is never an optimal strategy.
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Once all of the subjects were satisfied with their responses, all of the forms were
collected. The monitor then rolled a die to decide which task would be used for
determining payment. The monitor then rolled another die to determine the number
of green chips that the monitor would place in the bag. The researcher then held the
bag while the monitor drew on behalf of each subject (with replacement). This process
was done in front of the subjects. Each subject had been assigned an ID number to
maintain anonymity while allowing the subject to know when the monitor was drawing
on her behalf. With the exception of the monitor, the subjects then completed a brief
survey that included demographic questions and the cognitive reflection task (CRT)
of Frederick (2005), received their payment in private, and were dismissed from the
experiment.
3.6 Predicted Behavior
In the Individual choices, a risk-neutral player will enter whenever λ > 0.1875. Table
1 reports the predicted entry decision for the four main contest structures of interest
for each value of λ, under the assumption of risk neutrality.
In general, WTA-Public is expected to induce more innovation than WTA-Private
and at least as much innovation as Shared-Public. The main other prediction of
interest is that when λ is low (0.25), the WTA-Public contest is predicted to induce
the most innovation, but when λ is high (0.75), the Shared-Private contest is predicted
to induce the most innovation. Thus, the theory makes predictions about which
contest the designer will prefer under various regimes, and the experiment will allow
us to determine whether the same contests that are theoretically optimal are also
behaviorally optimal.
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WTA-Private
λ Period 1 Period 2 | fi
0.05 Exit Exit
0.25 Enter Exit
0.50 Enter Exit
0.75 Enter Exit
1.00 Enter Exit
Shared-Private
λ Period 1 Period 2 | fi
0.05 Exit Exit
0.25 Enter Exit
0.50 Enter Enter
0.75 Enter Enter
1.00 Enter Exit
WTA-Public
λ Period 1 Period 2 | fi & fj Period 2 | fi & sj
0.05 Exit Exit Exit
0.25 Enter Enter Exit
0.50 Enter Enter Exit
0.75 Enter Exit Exit
1.00 Enter Exit Exit
Shared-Public
λ Period 1 Period 2 | fi & fj Period 2 | fi & sj
0.05 Exit Exit Exit
0.25 Enter Enter Exit
0.50 Enter Enter Enter
0.75 Enter Exit Enter
1.00 Enter Exit NA
Table 1: Summary of Predicted Behavior for Two-Period Contests. Let f
be an indicator variable for failure in period 1, and let s be an indicator variable for
success in period 1.
4 Experimental Results
In the Individual tasks, the participants had to decide if they wished to attempt an
innovation or not. Table 2 classifies participants based upon their decisions in the
Individual task. 89% of the participants behaved in a manner consistent with having
CRRA utility.12 Borrowing the classifications from Holt and Laury (2002), Table 2
suggests that the vast majority of the participants can be classified as risk neutral or
slightly risk averse. A few participants are risk averse, but only a very small number
are very risk averse or risk loving.
The results now shift to the two-period two-player innovation contests. While
the focus of the experiments is on behavior in period 2, it is worth noting that all
four contest structures should generate identical period 1 decisions given the selected
parameters. This is largely the case. Table 3 shows the average period 1 entry rate by
λ. With the exception of the case in which innovation is highly unlikely (λ = 0.05),
12The comparable rate in the baseline condition of Holt and Laury (2002) was 87%.
14
participants should engage in R&D in period 1, and they typically do. However,
participants also frequently engage in R&D in period 1 even when they should not.
Share of Subjects CRRA Parameter
Interval
0.05 (−∞,−0.12]
0.30 [−0.12, 0.15]
0.36 [0.15, 0.40]
0.14 [0.40, 0.69]
0.04 [0.69,∞]
0.11 NA
Table 2: Behavior in Individual Contests.
Table 4 shows the results of a linear probability regression model with standard
errors clustered at the subject level, as subjects do not interact. The specification
includes indicator variables for each contest structure interacted with each value of λ
as well as various control variables for age, sex, risk (the number of entry decisions
in the Individual tasks), and CRT score. The constant term captures entry rates
conditional on the covariates in the Shared-Private contest with λ = 0.05, and the
coefficients on the other contest×λ variables can be interpreted as marginal effects of
the specified treatment and parameter combination.13
The theory predicts identical behavior across treatments for each value of λ in
period 1. Table 3 reports the treatment entry rates, the average entry rate across
treatments and the p-value associated with the F-test that the relevant coefficients
in column (1) of Table 4 are identical. Only when λ = 0.05 do we find a significant
treatment difference, driven by slightly higher entry rates in the Public contests.
Turning to the main focus of the paper, Figure 1 plots the percentage of poten-
tial innovators who attempt R&D again in period 2 after a period 1 failure. Several
13The results are qualitatively unchanged if we instead use logistic regression (see Appendix A),
but we prefer OLS for ease of interpretation.
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Shared WTA Shared WTA Average Test of Equal Entry
λ Private Private Public Public Entry Rate F-Stat p-value
0.05 0.62 0.59 0.73 0.71 0.66 3.06 0.04
0.25 0.84 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.85 1.02 0.39
0.50 0.93 0.88 0.93 0.98 0.93 2.37 0.08
0.75 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.95 0.93 1.33 0.27
1.00 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.73 0.71 1.25 0.30
Table 3: Behavior in Period 1 of Innovation Contests.
patterns become immediately apparent in this figure. First, in a Shared-Public con-
test, there is considerable copy-catting after a rival’s success, particularly when λ is
high.14 Column (2) of Table 4 provides regression analysis of period 2 behavior with
standard errors clustered at the subject level. The copycat behavior is evidenced
by the positive and significant coefficients for the SharedPublic × Other Success1 ×
λ = 0.50 and SharedPublic × Other Success1 × λ = 0.75 variables in column (2) of
the table.15 This leads to Finding 1.
Finding 1. A Shared-Public innovation contest encourages costly duplication follow-
ing successful innovation.
While a rival’s success leads to costly duplication in Shared-Public, if neither par-
ticipant is successful in period 1, then a Shared-Public contest and a WTA-Public
contest are strategically equivalent. This is the pattern revealed in Figure 1. Statis-
tical support for this pattern can be found in Table 4. Wald tests cannot reject that
the coefficient on Shared-Public × λ = X equals the coefficient on WTA-Public x
λ = X for X = 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, or 1.00, all p-values > 0.15. This provides the
support Finding 2.
14 When λ = 1, either both innovators are successful in period 1 or both fail and hence costly
duplication cannot arise.
15Note that when λ = 0.05 or 0.25, even when the other person has already succeeded, a risk-
neutral player will choose not to copycat because the expected value of entry for a shared prize is
low. When λ = 1, it is not possible for one player to succeed in period 1 and the other player to fail.
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Figure 1: Probability of Entry in Period 2.
Finding 2. A Shared-Public contest and a WTA-Public contest are behaviorally
indistinguishable in period 2 if neither potential innovator had success in period 1.
Findings 1 and 2 together confirm that a WTA-Public contest dominates a Shared-
Public.
Another pattern that is apparent from Figure 1 is that WTA-Private and Shared-
Private lead to qualitatively similar behavior. In both types of contests, when inno-
vation success is likely, many participants engage in R&D even after an initial failure.
16 However, the rate at which a second attempt at innovation is made is statistically
higher in Shared-Private than in WTA-Private. Formally, Wald tests that the coef-
ficients on WTA-Private × λ = X and Shared-Private × λ = X for X = 0.05, 0.25,
16When λ = 1, failure in period 1 reveals that the bad state has occurred with certainty, and there
is no point in attempting to innovate. Very few participants do.
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Period 1 Period 2
Entered Contest (1) (2)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.05 0.107∗ -0.036
(0.049) (0.063)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.25 0.232∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(0.068) (0.087)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.50 0.304∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.081)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.75 0.268∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.066) (0.067)
WTA-Public ×λ=1 0.125 -0.143∗
(0.068) (0.060)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.05 0.089 0.036
(0.047) (0.057)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.25 0.268∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.079)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.50 0.357∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.081)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.75 0.321∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(0.064) (0.064)
Shared-Public ×λ=1 0.107 -0.179∗∗
(0.067) (0.058)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.05 0.000
(0.058)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.25 0.091
(0.080)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.50 0.161∗∗
(0.056)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.75 0.589∗∗∗
(0.072)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.05 -0.036 -0.018
(0.051) (0.060)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.25 0.196∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(0.065) (0.079)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.50 0.250∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.093)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.75 0.286∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.077)
WTA-Private ×λ=1 0.089 -0.161∗
(0.069) (0.062)
Shared-Private ×λ=0.25 0.214∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.081)
Shared-Private ×λ=0.50 0.304∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.069)
Shared-Private ×λ=0.75 0.339∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065)
Shared-Private ×λ=1 0.036 -0.143∗
(0.063) (0.065)
Age -0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.002)
Femalea -0.017 -0.087∗
(0.069) (0.041)
Cognitive Reflection -0.091∗∗ 0.016
(0.029) (0.021)
# of Entries in Individual Choices -0.006 0.079∗∗
(0.025) (0.026)
Constant 0.879∗∗∗ -0.017
(Shared-Private ×λ=0.05) (0.143) (0.116)
Observations 1119 1342
R-Sq. 0.167 0.395
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
aOne subject chose not to identify as male or female, so the regression
includes a dummy for that subject, which is suppressed in the table.
Table 4: Regression Analysis of Contest Entry, by Period.
0.50, 0.75, or 1.00 reject the null of equal entry rates, as predicted (see Table 1), only
when λ = 0.50 and 0.75, p-values = 0.03 and 0.02, respectively. This provides the
basis for Finding 3.
Finding 3. A Winner-Take-All payment rule discourages innovation in period 2
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when period 1 outcomes remain private.
While Finding 3 is consistent with the theoretical predictions, it is important
to recognize that behavior in these contests does not closely follow the theory. For
Shared-Private, participants are not predicted to engage in R&D when λ = 0.25,
but they do. For WTA-Private participants are never predicted to engage in R&D
following failure in period 1, but commonly do anyway. Interestingly, both of these
errors work in the favor of the designer.
A fourth pattern that emerges from Figure 1 is that Public disclosure of period
1 outcomes can discourage innovation when success is likely. In particular, when
λ = 0.75 a second innovation attempt is more likely in Shared-Private than Shared-
Public and more likely in WTA-Private than WTA-Public. These comparisons are
statistically significant based on Wald tests comparing the relevant coefficients in
Table 4, both p-values < 0.001. This provides the support for Finding 4.
Finding 4. Public disclosure of period 1 outcomes can discourage subsequent
innovation attempts regardless of the payment rule.
Finding 4 contradicts the prediction that a WTA-Public contest dominates a
WTA-Private contest. Findings 3 and 4 together suggest that a Shared-Private con-
test may be the best choice for the designer. The final finding addresses this issue
directly. Theoretically, a Shared-Private contest should only be preferable to WTA-
Public when λ = 0.75. When λ = 0.25 the reverse should be true. For the other values
of λ used in the experiment, the two should generate the same pattern of behavior.
Table 5 reports the p-values associated with testing that period 2 entry behavior is
the same for each λ based on the regression results in Table 4. The results in Table
5 show that Shared-Private leads to more period 2 R&D when it should, but never
leads to lower period 2 R&D. This yields the following.
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Finding 5. A Shared-Private contest encourages the most innovation.
Entry Rate Test of Equal Entry
λ Differencea F-Stat p-value
0.05 0.04 0.32 0.57
0.25 0.04 0.21 0.65
0.50 0.07 1.58 0.21
0.75 0.60 77.27 <0.001
1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
aDifference in entry rates computed as
Shared-Private – WTA-Public.
Table 5: Comparison of Shared-Private and WTA-Public.
The analysis in table 4 also reveals that personal characteristics have some impact
on innovation behavior. In particular, in period 1 the results indicate that subjects
with higher CRT scores are less willing to enter, while age and gender do not play
a role. With respect to period 2, women are less likely to try again, but age and
CRT scores are not significant determinants. Risk is significant in period 2, but not
period 1. This is driven by the fact that the expected gain from entering is closer
to the expected cost in period 2, providing more scope for the levels of risk aversion
observed in the Individual tasks to influence behavior.
5 Conclusion
As contests continue to be used as a mechanism to encourage innovation in a targeted
area, it is important to understand how the specific structure of the contests impacts
the incentives of potential innovators. In the laboratory, we vary two aspects of a
contest’s structure that a designer can manipulate: the payment rule and the dis-
closure rule, which Halac et al. (forthcoming) model theoretically. A winner-take-all
contest with public disclosure of early successes and failures avoids the later copycat
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behavior that a contest with public disclosure in which all successful innovators share
in the prize encourages. Further, public disclosure in a winner-take-all contest should
encourage more innovation than a winner-take-all contest where this information re-
mains private, as the fear of being locked out of the prize discourages subsequent
attempts to innovate. However, a key insight of Halac et al. (forthcoming) is that
in some situations a contest where early outcomes remain private and all successful
innovators share in the prize can be optimal. This is because such a contest avoids
the discouraging effect that learning of other’s failures can provide while eliminating
the concern about being shut out of contention for prize money.
In the laboratory, public disclosure did encourage wasteful copycat behavior when
the prize was shared, indicating that a winner-take-all contest is preferable to a shared
prize contest when performance is publicly disclosed.17 However, public disclosure is
found to discourage innovation attempts regardless of the payment scheme. Further,
a winner-take-all rule discourages innovation when outcomes from early attempts
at innovation remain private. Therefore, from a behavioral perspective a private
information prize sharing contest is optimal in our setting. Of course, further research
on this topic such as understanding why public revelation discourages innovation is
warranted along with tests of alternative contest structures.
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A Additional Analysis
Period 1 Period 2
Entered Contest (1) (2)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.05 0.573∗ -0.239
(0.251) (0.416)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.25 1.449∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗
(0.412) (0.455)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.50 2.272∗∗∗ 2.904∗∗∗
(0.594) (0.523)
WTA-Public ×λ=0.75 1.803∗∗∗ 0.407
(0.437) (0.383)
WTA-Public ×λ=1 0.679 -1.315∗
(0.363) (0.582)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.05 0.471∗ 0.213
(0.238) (0.338)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.25 1.797∗∗∗ 1.519∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.413)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.50 3.751∗∗∗ 2.575∗∗∗
(0.987) (0.485)
Shared-Public ×λ=0.75 2.591∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗
(0.553) (0.333)
Shared-Public ×λ=1 0.573 -2.059∗∗
(0.347) (0.772)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.05 0.000
(0.323)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.25 0.403
(0.351)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.50 1.280∗∗
(0.471)
Shared-Public × Other Success1 × λ=0.75 4.644∗∗∗
(1.128)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.05 -0.176 -0.115
(0.251) (0.386)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.25 1.158∗∗ 1.316∗∗
(0.371) (0.412)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.50 1.616∗∗∗ 2.476∗∗∗
(0.479) (0.545)
WTA-Private ×λ=0.75 2.017∗∗∗ 2.381∗∗∗
(0.531) (0.445)
WTA-Private ×λ=1 0.471 -1.628∗
(0.367) (0.680)
Shared-Private ×λ=0.25 1.298∗∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.426)
Shared-Private ×λ=0.50 2.272∗∗∗ 3.466∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.540)
Shared-Private ×λ=0.75 3.027∗∗∗ 3.466∗∗∗
(0.715) (0.494)
Shared-Private ×λ=1 0.182 -1.315∗
(0.317) (0.635)
Age -0.037 0.019
(0.031) (0.012)
Femalea -0.237 -0.576∗
(0.586) (0.271)
Cognitive Reflection -0.755∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.227) (0.136)
# of Entries in Individual Choices -0.093 0.526∗∗
(0.212) (0.179)
Constant 2.788∗∗ -2.941∗∗∗
(Shared-Private ×λ=0.05) (1.079) (0.801)
Observations 1119 1342
R-Sq. 0.19 0.34
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
aOne subject chose not to identify as male or female, so the regression
includes a dummy for that subject, which is suppressed in the table.
Table A1: Logistic Regression Analysis of Contest Entry, by Period.
Table A1 shows that the analyses reported in the body of the paper are robust to
using logistic regression in place of OLS.
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